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of several films in the 1930's. I hope to encourage discussion about 
law and legal issues that does not systematically ignore the way the 
world actually works for most of us. In a small way, I think 
Robertson's book on film censorship helps in that endeavor. 
CONSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY: THE POLITICAL 
FORTUNES OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT. 
By Gilbert Y. Steiner.1 Washington, D.C.: The Brookings In-
stitution. 1985. Pp. 113. Cloth, $22.95; paper, $8.95. 
Leslie Friedman Goldstein 2 
The death and burial of the ERA appears to have operated as a 
fertilizer for the blossoming of new scholarship on the subject. 
While the ERA was clearly in its death throes, only one book on the 
subject appeared.3 Now that it has vanished from the political spot-
light, scholars interested in its fate will be able to luxuriate in a 
variegated garden of books on ERA politics. Books are due out 
very soon from lawyer-historian Mary Berry, Why ERA Failed; his-
torian Joan Hoff-Wilson, an edited collection of essays, Rights of 
Passage: The Past and Future of the ERA; political scientists Jane 
Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA; and political scientist Cynthia 
Harrison, who wrote a Columbia Ph.D. dissertation on feminist 
politics at the federal level from 1942-68. 
The first flowering of this new crop is Gilbert Steiner's slim 
volume, published in 1985. The reader who is looking for a meaty 
political analysis of "the political fortunes of the ERA," the analysis 
of "what went wrong" that is promised on the book cover, would be 
well-advised to wait for some of the later harvest. On the other 
hand, readers with a more narrowly focused intellectual appetite--
readers looking for a good, insider's account of the congressional 
politics surrounding the ERA's overwhelming success in the early 
1970's and its narrow defeat when reintroduced in the House of 
Representatives on November 15, 1983-will find the book quite 
satisfying. Steiner, a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, 
who has previously written about child and family policy, the wel-
fare system, and abortion, is at his best when exposing the intrigues 
and maneuvers of Capitol Hill politics. An explanation of the de-
feat of the ERA, however, must do more. 
1. Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 
2. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware. 
3. J. BoLES, THE POLITICS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1979). 
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Constitutional Inequality consists of five chapters. The first is 
the best. It provides a useful, behind-the-scenes history of the 
ERA's progress up through its congressional adoption on March 
22, 1972. Most of the delay in its progress, from its initial introduc-
tion in Congress in 1923 to the first favorable House vote in 1970, 
resulted from opposition by organized labor. Organized labor had 
long promoted protective legislation for working women and feared 
the ERA's impact. The 1964 Civil Rights Act effectively doomed 
gender-based protective legislation. At this point, the path was 
cleared for congressional passage of the ERA. Martha Griffiths 
emerges as the heroine of the Capital Hill victory of the early seven-
ties; she employed savvy parliamentary maneuvers around Emanuel 
Celler, the obdurate octogenarian chair of the House Judiciary 
Committee who had been sitting on the bill for decades. 
Chapter two criticizes a variety of explanations of the ERA's 
defeat that have already appeared in print. It is, in general, a credit-
able contribution, though seriously flawed by egregious inattention 
to relevant Supreme Court activity during the ratification period. 
As anyone who followed the ERA debate even slightly knows, two 
of the most frequently made arguments against the ERA were: 
(1) it is not needed; and (2) it will deprive wives of their husband's 
legal obligation to support them. The latter argument was invaria-
bly presented by Phyllis Schlafty in her many state legislative ap-
pearances as the leader of STOP-ERA.4 Despite the apparent 
salience of these two concerns, the two Supreme Court decisions 
essential for evaluating them, Craig v. Boren s and Orr v. Orr,6 are 
nowhere mentioned in this volume. It is as though someone wrote a 
history of the first sentence of the fourteenth amendment without 
ever mentioning Dred Scott. (In fact the only Court decisions after 
1973 that Steiner deigns to discuss are those related to abortion and 
the draft; he examines those apparently because they are relevant to 
his causal analysis).7 
4. She repeated this argument long after 1979, when Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), 
destroyed any shred of its validity, by which time, incidentally, she had a law degree and 
almost certainly knew better. 
5. 429 u.s. 190 (1976). 
6. 440 u.s. 268 (1979). 
7. He slips Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), and Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 
498 (1975) into a footnote. The book reads as though there were no major judicial develop-
ment to promote gender equity after Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). And his 
explanation of the import of the suspect classification debate in Frontiero is mindbogglingly 
inadequate: "A finding of unconstitutional discrimination could be based narrowly on the 
particular statutes in question or could be based broadly on the rationale that ERA support-
ers had long urged-that sex is a suspect classification." One page later he cites Wilkinson, 
The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional 
Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945, 977, 983 (1975), for the idea that the concept of suspect classi-
560 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:558 
The first argument Steiner assesses is that the ERA failed be-
cause the constitutional amendment process has become too diffi-
cult. Ten thousand amendments have been submitted over the past 
two hundred years; only twenty-six succeeded, ten of which came as 
a package deal in the founding period and three of which (the thir-
teenth through fifteenth) resulted from a bending of the rules during 
the secession crisis. On the other hand, once Congress has pro-
posed an amendment by a two-thirds vote in each house, the norm 
is ratification. Only seven amendments that made it over that high 
hurdle failed to achieve ratification. In the period since the Civil 
War, only three have so failed. One of the three, the child labor 
amendment, was rendered clearly unnecessary by changes in 
Supreme Court decisions during the ratification process. Another 
was the ERA. The third was the proposal for congressional repre-
fication is both "highly arbitrary and badly confused." Steiner then concludes, "The argu-
ment that the amendment has become unnecessary could only be sustained if the Supreme 
Court forbade all classifications based on sex." No ERA proponent has asserted that the 
ERA would ban all statutory gender classifications. Instead, ERA proponents repeatedly 
acknowledged that the ERA would permit certain exceptional gender classifications: One 
permitted category covered laws imposing "reasonable classifications based on characteristics 
that are unique to one sex," such as laws providing the medical costs of childbearing or laws 
punishing rape. Equal Rights 1970: Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231 before the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 183, 299, 303 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 
359, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971); S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 16, 20 (1972); and 
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis 
for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 893-96 (1971). (The House chief sponsor, 
Representative Martha Griffiths, distributed this article by Professor Thomas Emerson of 
Yale Law School and three of his students, to every member, and Senator Birch Bayh, chief 
sponsor in the Senate, had it inserted into the Congressional Record.) The second permitted 
category covered affirmative-action-style laws designed to ameliorate the effects of societal 
discrimination against women. 
On the only occasion where the Supreme Court discussed the impact of the ERA, Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, supra, seven of the nine Justices showed an apparent inclination to fit 
these intended exceptions into the "compelling government interest" rubric, in that they 
viewed the ERA as rendering gender a suspect classification. As readers of this journal of 
course know, suspect classifications are not totally prohibited (contra Steiner) but are prohib-
ited unless necessitated by a compelling governmental interest. Steiner repeats his error 
about the meaning of "suspect classification" on page 102. However, at page 109 he seems to 
indicate at least a question as to whether suspect classifications are totally forbidden classifi-
cations, for he suggests that the Court should now declare sex to be a suspect classification 
"without mixing that ruling, at least for the time being, with consideration of its effects on ... 
military combat, ... [a subject] on which it has previously ruled." Also, he hedges slightly 
with the word "virtually": "If sex were suspect, any sex-based classification would be subject 
to 'close judicial scrutiny,' virtually an automatic death sentence for any classification under 
challenge." Apparently, no one told Steiner about the wide range of first amendment and 
voting rights cases where laws facing the "virtually automatic death sentence" of "close judi-
cial scrutiny" miraculously survived, nor of such cases as Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 
(1944); North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971); Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); and Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. I, 458 U.S. 457 
(1982); where the Court indicated that some governmental interests are indeed compelling 
enough to justify even that most suspect of suspect classifications, race. 
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sentation for the District of Columbia proposed by Congress in 
1978. 
Steiner concludes, probably too readily, that the "stacked 
deck" argument is unconvincing because the ERA is the only exam-
ple of "stacking." He excludes the District of Columbia representa-
tion case as a persuasive example because he does not see much 
appeal in that amendment. The District of Columbia has "fewer 
than a million people" and the change "significantly dilutes the vot-
ing power in the Senate of each of the fifty states." 
His own account, however, should have given him more pause: 
the only two congressionally proposed amendments that really 
failed in the postbellum period were both proposed after the widely 
discussed weakening of political parties during the decade of the 
1960's. The only amendment to get ratified since that time was the 
twenty-sixth, adopted in direct response to Oregon v. Mitchells 
which had, in effect, put a multi-million dollar price tag on failure 
to ratify, (Mitchell would have forced states to run two separate 
systems of state and federal elections). Steiner notes that six 
amendments were adopted between 1913 and 1933 and five between 
1951 and 1971, implying that the pace has not slowed. But since 
the decline in political parties in the 1960's,9 the pace of amend-
ments certainly has slowed to something very like a halt. It appears 
highly unlikely that the 1972 to 1992 period will produce the for-
merly routine figure of a half-dozen amendments every two decades. 
The Constitution may not be in theory a deck stacked against 
change, but the current political environment of drastically weak-
ened political parties may well have rendered the amendment pro-
cess impracticably difficult. When an amendment endorsed for 
many years by both political parties, capable of garnering over 
ninety percent of the congressional vote in both houses, and sup-
ported consistently in public opinion polls, including majorites in 
every state, cannot attain ratification, that failure suggests that the 
current political environment may necessitate easing the amend-
ment process, if the Constitution is to continue to express the will of 
"the people" as to the fundamental rules governing them. 
The second postmortem diagnosis, the blame-it-on-the-Presi-
dent analysis, is accorded somewhat more credibility by Steiner. 
But he transforms the diagnosis from presidential indifference to 
presidential ineptness. He notes that the crucial period when a sup-
8. 400 u.s. 112 (1970). 
9. From 1964 to 1972 the number of eligible voters reporting their party loyalty as 
"independent" shot up from just over 20% (where it had rested since 1952) to approximately 
35%, around which it has hovered since then. R. BAKER, G. POMPER, AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT (1983). 
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portive president could have helped was 1974-80, so the onus of 
responsibility (to the degree that it falls to the Presidency at all) 
goes to Ford and Carter. Steiner faults not their sincerity of sup-
port but their leadership skills and energy: "When it [the ERA] 
most needed a strategist of the Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon 
school, Gerald Ford found it expedient to hand this ball off to his 
wife." Steiner leaves unexplored the interesting normative question 
of whether the President should play a strong role in the state ratifi-
cation process. 
Steiner next takes up what he calls the "in lieu approaches," 
i.e., the analysis that attributes ERA's demise to the "body of 
favorable legislative actions and judicial rulings that appeared in the 
1960s and 1970s." In brief, this explanation says that the ERA 
failed because people believed it was no longer needed. This analy-
sis pays heed to the teaching of political scientist Clement Vose that 
Congress, the President, or the Supreme Court can issue statutes, 
orders, or rulings that carry no less weight than a formal constitu-
tional amendment.IO In this century one constitutional amend-
ment, the child labor amendment, became the law of the land 
through a shift of Supreme Court decisions, and Vose for one has 
suggested that, for all practical purposes, the same has happened 
with the ERA.'' Gilbert Steiner, taking the remarks of ERA advo-
cates at face value, is unpersuaded that Supreme Court decisions 
have effectively enacted the ERA. But his discussion remains both 
unconvincing and disappointing, because he ignores the advances in 
constitutional law produced by the Supreme Court in the critical 
period after 1973. He shows no awareness of Craig v. Boren, 
wherein the Court announced an explicit rule of intermediate scru-
tiny. (Some would argue, intermediate in label but strict in fact). 
Steiner rejects the "in lieu approaches" analysis because the 
ERA still had active, vocal proponents in 1983 who believed (per-
haps sometimes in ignorance) that the Supreme Court had not done 
enough. But Steiner's treatment lacks the careful review of 
Supreme Court doctrine that would seem to be a minimal require-
ment for intelligently assessing the "in lieu" explanation. Not only 
is there no effort made to see if any state legislator was swayed by 
10. C. VOSE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMENDMENT POLITICS AND SUPREME 
COURT LITIGATION SINCE 1900, at xxiii, 65 (1972); quoted at pp. 36, 38. 
II. This suggestion was made in oral remarks at a panel of the annual conference of the 
American Political Science Association in September 1984, in commenting on L. Goldstein, 
The ERA and American Public Policy (paper delivered at conference). There is no reason to 
believe Steiner knew of the remarks. Goldstein's paper argued that the Court has been behav-
ing since 1972 as though the ERA were law, but she had not drawn the parallel to the child 
labor amendment. Jane Mansbridge in Why We Lost the ERA (forthcoming), chapter 4, like 
Vose, also draws the parallel to the child labor amendment. 
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the belief that the ERA was no longer needed, there is not even a 
serious effort made to determine whether there was a factual basis 
for such a belief by, say, 1977. 
Next Steiner takes up the 1982 analysis by Janet Boles,12 au-
thor of what had previously been the only book on the ERA. 13 In 
her 1982 reading of the situation, she suggested that the National 
Organization for Women (NOW), en route to ratification of the 
ERA, became distracted by its interest in increasing its member-
ship. Steiner makes the sensible point that an organization may 
grow and flourish while pursuing a substantive goal (other than 
growth). He concludes persuasively that there is simply no good 
evidence of "a shift in primary purpose away from enacting [the] 
ERA in favor of sustaining NOW." 
Finally, Steiner considers Andrew Hacker's argument that 
older and more old-fashioned housewives, fearing the impact of an 
ERA on divorce settlements and other protections available to 
housewives, buried the ERA.I4 Here Steiner's analysis is of mixed 
quality. On the plus side, he astutely points out that a great many 
quite traditional women's organizations (including the National 
Council of Senior Citizens and mainstream church groups) actively 
supported the ERA and that majorities of "housewives committed 
to traditional roles" consistently showed up on opinion surveys as 
favoring the ERA. Is 
On the minus side, Steiner neglects the fact that a group does 
not have to be a majority to be influential, especially in amendment 
politics where only thirteen of the ninety-nine state legislative 
houses (13.1%) are enough to block ratification, and where two of 
those houses (in Illinois) permit votes of forty percent plus one to 
block ratification. Secondly, he neglects the indisputably sharp de-
cline of social status experienced by housewives from 1960-80, an 
experience likely to promote anxiety about further change.I6 
12. Boles, Building Support for the ERA: A Case of "Too Much. Too Late," 15 PS 572, 
576 (1982). 
13. Boles, supra note 3. In her book Boles suggested that the constitutional amendment 
process is such that an amendment can pass if it is contained within the arena of (elite-
dominated) established interest group politics, but that if conflict over the amendment 
spreads to the grass-roots level (as happened), the amendment is doomed. A more sophisti-
cated version of this early Boles analysis might supplement it with attention to the decline of 
parties discussed above. 
14. Hacker, E.R.A.-R.l.P., HARPER'S, September 1980, at 10, 14. 
15. Daniels, Darcy & Westphal, The ERA Won-At Least in the Opinion Polls, 15 PS 
578, 580 (1982). Gallup Opinion Index, no. 178 (June, 1980), cited at pp. 46-47. 
16. Mansbridge, supra note II, provides concrete facts to support this common sense 
perception of a status decline. In 1962, 37% of married women were employed outside the 
home; by 1978, 58% were. But the shift was totally the product of movement by higher 
status women into the labor force. The percentage of wives of men with a grade school 
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Thirdly, he looks at the incidence of alimony awards (only fourteen 
percent) and at the infrequency of actual payment, but he totally 
ignores the 1979 Supreme Court decisiont7 declaring unconstitu-
tional all gender-based alimony laws. Finally, he seriously underes-
timates the symbolic role of the husband-support argument. It was 
no accident that Phyllis Schlafly routinely combined it with the wo-
man-in-draft-and-combat argument. For the two issues together 
vividly called up the image of a way of life in which Man was the 
protector and guardian of his Little Woman. This image struck a 
very deep chord in the hearts and minds of a substantial minority of 
Americans, a great many of them associated with fundamentalist 
Christian churches.ts Although Steiner notices that this same 
group of people are intensely concerned about the abortion issue, he 
fails to accord adequate significance to the power of their fears con-
cerning changes in their life and in the status of the traditional fam-
ily. To the degree that the ERA was successfully rendered a symbol 
of such changes, these fears influenced its defeat. Steiner fails to 
notice or acknowledge that impact. 
Steiner concludes his second chapter, in just about the middle 
of the book, with the assertion that something must have changed 
dramatically in 1973, for the ERA's fortunes did. He elaborates 
this point in chapter three. Steiner cannot believe that the combat 
argument or the change-in-family-law argument, of their own force, 
really affected anything, since they had been made by ERA oppo-
nents during its period of greatest success, 1970-72. Having just 
edited a book on abortion,t9 Steiner recalls that Roe v. Wade2o was 
handed down on January 22, 1973. He believes that this decision 
contributed greatly to the defeat of the ERA. Roe made abortion a 
national political issue, and NOW was very much identified pub-
licly with both pro-ERA and pro-abortion politics. "A substantial 
part of the explanation lies in the accident of timing that made abor-
tion policy a national issue during those crucial years." 
As "another part of the explanation" for the ERA's failure to 
education who were in the paid labor force was unchanged from 1962 to 1978-it held steady 
at 34%. But the percentage of employed wives of men with some college education jumped 
dramatically from 1962 to 1978, from 38% to 65%. 
17. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
18. Burris, Who Opposed the ERA? An Analysis of the Social Basis of Antifeminism, 64 
Soc. SCI. Q. 305 (1983) (finding that the only major demographic groups where a majority 
did not favor the ERA in late 1980 were Mormons and persons who attended church every 
week). A variety of studies associated ERA opposition with political conservatism and with 
religious fundamentalism. See. e.g., Daniels, Darcy & Westphal, supra note 15; Tedin, Reli-
gious Preference and Pro/Anti Activism on the Equal Rights Amendment Issue, 21 PAC. Soc. 
REV. 55 (1978). 
19. THE ABORTION DISPUTE AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM (G. Steiner ed. 1983). 
20. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
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achieve ratification in the original 1972-78 period, he proffers the 
rise to national hero status of Sam Ervin, long-time opponent of the 
ERA, as a result of the Senate Watergate hearings. As to calculat-
ing the latter's actual influence in the state rejections of ratification, 
Steiner poses that question and then responds to it: 
The question is unanswerable. What is certain is that the views of Ervin as a consti-
tutional hero figured far more significantly in the evolution of a climate of doubt, 
hesitation, and restraint nurtured by ERA's opposition than those same views had 
figured when Ervin was merely a small town constitutional lawyer in a Senate seat. 
This quote pretty well captures the cavalier tone of this whole 
book regarding evidence for its claims. Steiner presents no evidence 
that even one citizen, one lobbyist, or one legislator was in fact in-
fluenced to oppose the ERA, or even claimed to have been so influ-
enced, out of respect for Sam Ervin and his anti-ERA testimony. 
The essence of Steiner's purported causal analysis is that he noticed 
a timing coincidence. Sam Ervin rose to public prominence in the 
second half of 1973, just as the ERA's popularity seemed to slow. 
Abortion was legalized nationwide by Supreme Court fiat early in 
the same year. Steiner fails to note that it had been legalized in a 
number of states by judicial and legislative action in the 1969-72 
period. He does acknowledge that abortion was a matter of contro-
versy at the state level, but he somewhat misleadingly says that Roe 
provided women with an "instant new right . . . to be rid of an 
unwanted fetus." 
The supposedly new insight contributed by this book is that 
Steiner noticed three coincidences: (1) the national legalization of 
abortion and (2) the rise to heroic status of Sam Ervin occurred in 
the critical 1973-74 period, when the pace of ERA ratification 
slowed. Then (3), in the extended ratification period of 1978-82, the 
Soviets invaded Afghanistan, stimulating President Carter to rein-
state registration for the draft in 1980. According to Steiner, this 
coincidence raised the salience and plausibility of the women-in-
draft-and-combat critique of the ERA. Perhaps it did, as compared 
to, say, 1976, when no Americans were being registered. (The draft 
ended in January 1973 and registration for the draft ended in April 
1975). But it simply beggars belief to claim that the draft/combat 
issue was more salient and influential in 1980, when no Americans 
were being drafted or sent into combat-and when no states ratified 
the ERA-than it was in 1972, when many thousands of American 
soldiers were being drafted and sent into combat, and the draft and 
war in Vietnam were burning political issues-and when twenty-
two states ratified the ERA. 
This sort of argument putting forth timing coincidences as 
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causal analysis is the stuff of Potomac community cocktail parties, 
not reputable policy analysis. 
Steiner does not report that he either conducted or examined 
any public opinion polls, any interviews or questionnaires of legisla-
tors or lobbyists, or even that he looked at newspaper accounts of 
legislators' speeches in the nonratifying states. How could he have 
gotten so carried away with this flimsy analysis as to make it the 
core of a book? One can only speculate. Steiner, well-attuned to 
insider Capitol Hill politics, is on solid ground when he explains the 
failure of a renewed ERA as tied to difficulties involving amend-
ments denying any connection to abortion funding and exempting 
women from the draft. He seems to have reasoned backwards in 
time: if the abortion funding and combat questions hurt the ERA 
in 1983, they must have led to its defeat in 1972-82. Since the ERA 
failed ratification by such a tiny number of votes (a switch of three 
votes in the Nevada Senate in 1975, two votes in the North Carolina 
Senate in 1977 and two votes in the Florida Senate in 1979 would 
have put the ERA in the Constitution), one can suggest almost any-
thing as the cause. But not all suggestions are equally persuasive. 
That the debate over abortion funding and combat, orchestrated by 
Orrin Hatch, a much cagier politician than old Sam Ervin, was in-
fluential in the 1983 Congress simply does not demonstrate that it 
influenced ERA history in 1972-76, the critical years for the 
amendment. 
As indicated above, Steiner's Sam Ervin argument is just an 
unsubstantiated suggestion, and his Afghanistan/registration argu-
ment is highly implausible even by his own standard of what looks 
like a credibly significant coincidence. His linkage of the abortion 
argument to the failure of the ERA thus boils down to the book's 
central argument, and it deserves further examination. 
On Steiner's side, one can cite a discernible and prominent co-
incidence of timing and organizational structures. Although legis-
latures in four states (Alaska, Hawaii, New York, and Washington) 
legalized abortion in 1970, and courts declared unconstitutional 
abortion statutes of eight states between 1970 and 1972, Roe v. 
Wade, handed down on January 22, 1973, certainly stimulated the 
formulation of an influential national anti-abortion movement. It is 
also true that the anti-abortion movement and the anti-ERA move-
ments had overlapping memberships. (Most anti-ERA-ers are anti-
abortion. Some, but by no means most, anti-abortion people are 
anti-ERA). Finally, the leading pro-ERA group, NOW, is also a 
very prominent pro-choice group. 
Steiner actually makes two separate abortion issue arguments. 
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The first is a Roe argument: anti-ERA people benefitted from the 
powerful anti-abortion backlash generated by Roe. This is an ex-
tremely weak argument, as I shall demonstrate below. Steiner's sec-
ond argument comes into play after the first Hyde Amendment was 
enacted in 1976. It ties the ERA's difficulties to a purported ERA 
implication of a right to abortion funding. This is a much more 
persuasive argument, for the abortion funding question clearly trou-
bled ERA forces in Congress in 1983. In the last few pages of the 
book, Steiner acknowledges this disparity in the quality of his two 
arguments: "Without Hyde, [the Hyde amendment funding restric-
tion] the connection between ERA and abortion does not exist, and 
the extraordinary majorities necessary to achieve renewal of the 
ERA should become more likely." 
This comes as a considerable surprise given the emphasis 
Steiner had earlier placed on Phyllis Schlafly's insistence that the 
right to obtain an abortion "was clearly not intended by those who 
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment" but would be "easier to find 
... [in the] ERA." Schlafly's argument was extraordinarily weak 
(as Steiner belatedly, admits), and it is hard to believe that the legal 
staff of the state legislators considering ratification did not so inform 
them. Schlafly's argument unwisely presupposes two unlikely 
things: (1) the Supreme Court would, with no particular incentive 
to do so, abandon its right to privacy doctrine as the girding for 
abortion choice, a doctrine that it has been steadily reaffirming since 
1965; and (2) that the Supreme Court would directly flout the 
guidelines of all the official congressional reports on the meaning of 
the ERA, which had insisted repeatedly that the ERA would not 
affect laws directly focused on actual, physiological differences be-
tween the sexes, such as laws dealing with maternity, rape, sperm 
donors, etc. 
Politics can, of course, be affected by irrational forces, but even 
as a political matter, Steiner's Roe argument is unconvincing. It is 
important to understand the timing. The ratification pace of the 
ERA was as follows: twenty-two of the thirty-two state legislatures 
that convened after the ERA left Congress in the calendar year 
1972 ratified. Eight more states ratified by the anniversary of 
ERA's congressional adoption, March 22, 1973. Roe was handed 
down on January 22, 1973; each of these eight were subsequent to 
Roe. Three more ratifications came in January and February 1974, 
one in February 1975, and one in January 1977. Every previous 
constitutional amendment adopted was ratified within four years of 
congressional adoption. After March of 1976, momentum operated 
against the ERA. A full year had passed with no ratification-the 
568 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:558 
ERA, despite opinion polls to the contrary, had acquired the look 
of a "loser." Failure to achieve ratification within the first few years 
creates the appearance that an amendment cannot garner a wide 
enough consensus to warrant altering the Constitution. 
Steiner realizes that the 197 4-7 5 period was critical. He mus-
ters the following facts for the influence of Roe in these years: 
( 1) Janet Boles noted that mailings were sent in 197 4 to Illinois 
legislators attempting to link the ERA with the pro-abortion move-
ment and with the idea that women's rights would mean a denial of 
fetal rights; (2) NOW visibly led both the pro-choice and pro-ERA 
movements and there was similar organizational overlap in the 
"anti" camp; (3) on January 9, 1975, Professor Joseph Witherspoon 
of the University of Texas Law School sent a telegram urging rescis-
sion on anti-abortion grounds to the Texas legislature; and (4) a 
Notre Dame law professor, Charles Rice, sent a letter to the Indi-
ana legislature in January 1975 urging a vote against the ERA on 
anti-abortion grounds. But what is the evidence that any of these 
facts mattered? As to Illinois, where abortion was described by Ja-
net Boles as only "a leading peripheral subject" both Boles and 
Steiner concluded that tangential forces of race and party leadership 
politics really determined the ERA's failure there.21 The Texas leg-
islature, where Witherspoon sent his telegram in 1975, did not vote 
to rescind; Indiana, where Rice sent his telegram in 1975, voted two 
years later to ratify the ERA. The year 1975 is cited by Steiner as a 
disaster for the ERA, among other reasons, because both New York 
and New Jersey voters defeated referenda for state ERAs that year. 
But New York was one of the few states that legislatively legalized 
abortion (in 1970) and continues to this day to fund abortions for 
the needy out of its own state funds. Steiner is correct that ERA 
opponents tried from 1974 on to tie it to abortion, as they tried to 
tie it to unisex toilets, but there is no good evidence that either argu-
ment had much impact in the critical 1972-76 period, when the 
ERA really lost. 
Steiner concludes his book with an extensive discussion of how 
Hyde Amendment politics became commingled with ERA poli-
tics.22 He blames the Court for Harris v. McRae, 2 3 which he says 
21. Although Boles calls abortion "leading" as a "peripheral" subject, she says, "The 
draft was the most commonly mentioned objection to the ERA [by legislators] in Illi-
nois .... " Boles, supra note 3, at 170. Her interviews were done in the first half of 1974. 
22. Steiner's fourth chapter is unremarkable and noncontroversial. Here he simply 
elaborates and assesses the widely held view that the use of unorthodox parliamentary proce-
dures did hurt ERA proponents twice. First, this happened at the stage when Congress ex-
tended the ratification period for three years, rather than start over in 1978 when they looked 
beat, and they even did this by simple majority rather than two-thirds vote. Among other 
things, this probably created a certain appearance of desperation, further confirming the 
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"delivered it [the ERA] into the hands of its enemies." Recall that 
he earlier blamed the court for Roe: "Fervent opponents [of Roe], 
including opponents who before had been largely indifferent to the 
ERA, were moved to take up arms against the proposed amend-
ment lest its inclusion in the Constitution be understood to legitimize 
a judicial opinion they were determined . .. to overturn." The Court 
is damned when it doesn't (void restrictions on abortion funding) 
and damned when it does (void restrictions on abortions). It is hard 
to imagine why Steiner does not see that if the Court had produced 
exactly the opposite holding in Harris he could have reiterated the 
same italicized remark about Harris that he gave us on Roe. 
Apart from this peculiar penchant for blaming the Court for 
almost everything that goes wrong (I left out his critique of Rostker 
v. Goldberg),24 Steiner's last chapter is persuasive in detailing the 
current congressional deadlock. Hyde Amendment stalwarts have 
too many votes to let an unamended ERA go through; pro-ERA 
forces tend to be pro-choice and do not wish to add an amendment 
that would appear to put the Constitution against public funding for 
abortion. Strangely enough, Steiner then concludes that the 
Supreme Court should rescue us from this dilemma by simply de-
claring sex to be a suspect classification. However, again, he does 
not seem to understand what this would mean.2s 
If the question of what killed ERA is taken, as Steiner takes it, 
to mean-"what dramatic event occurred after 1972 to lower sup-
port for the ERA?" it is worth entertaining the idea that the ques-
tion is misguided. It may well be that from 1972-78 nothing 
changed. Twenty-two of the thirty-two states that held legislative 
sessions between congressional adoption in March and the end of 
1972 voted to ratify. That comes to just about sixty-nine percent. 
ERA's "loser" image. But, as Steiner quite rightly points out, a damaged image hardly mat· 
tered, since by 1979 the ERA had lost in fact. So it does not make sense to attribute causal 
force to this first major bending of the rules. 
The second procedural unfairness alleged against the pro-ERA leadership occurred at 
the 1983 renewal stage. Faced with the apparent certainty of debilitating amendments on the 
draft and abortion funding, Representative Patricia Schroeder persuaded the Speaker to pre-
vail upon the Rules Committee to bring the ERA to the floor with no permission for amend-
ments. The members of the House who wanted amendments cried foul, and several ERA 
proponents apparently agreed. Twelve of the ERA cosponsors voted against it under these 
rules, and the ERA vote came to six short of the needed two-thirds. This time, procedures 
mattered. 
23. 448 u.s. 297 (1980). 
24. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). Predictably, his view is that the Court could have defused the 
draft/combat issue by ordering women drafted (or registered thereof) on fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection grounds. Of course, if the Court had done that, the anti-ERA forces 
could have reacted just as Steiner says they did to Roe v. Wade-the draft could have become 
even more salient an issue-so the Court would be blameworthy again. 
25. See note 7, supra. 
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By the end of the original time period, thirty-five of the fifty states 
had ratified (seventy percent). To be sure, the pace of ratification 
slowed but it may simply be the case that the states where support 
for the ERA was strong enough for passage (or where opposition to 
it was weak enough) were inclined to act within the first two years 
after congressional adoption. Sixty-six percent of the states had rat-
ified by February 1974. Steiner rejects out of hand, as "unconvinc-
ing," the comment by a leading ERA activist in January 1973. 
The momentum for passage ... has sort of worn out, because it has already gone 
through in most of the states where it was a natural. . . . [I)t's going to be tougher 
to get the last 16 states we need because there's a natural backlash setting in to-
wards the gains that women are making. 
Her explanation may in fact get to the heart of why the ERA failed. 
It had enough support, or lacked enough opposition, to succeed in 
over two-thirds of the state legislatures, but simply not three-
fourths of them.26 
Perhaps the current weakness of American political parties to 
some degree explains how an amendment with such wide support 
can be blocked from ratification. Perceiving the wide popular sup-
port for a legal principle against gender discrimination and the ap-
parent demise of the ERA (no ratification from February 1975 
through all of 1976), the U.S. Supreme Court stepped into the 
breach with Craig v. Boren 21 on December 20, 1976. This Christ-
mas present to American women declared that a series of cases be-
ginning with Reed v. Reed 2s in 1971 had already established as law 
the principle that "to withstand constitutional challenge ... classifi-
cations by gender must serve important governmental objectives 
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives."29 This test of intermediate scrutiny is arguably so close to 
the test of strict scrutiny ("necessary for attaining a compelling gov-
ernmental interest") that the Craig rule accomplishes virtually all 
the policy results that an ERA would accomplish. 
26. All the nonratifying states except Illinois were either southern (where religious fun-
damentalism is very strong) or Mormon. Illinois had a three-fifths passage rule and a third of 
the state is dominated by a rural southern culture. Mansbridge, supra note 11. 
27. 429 u.s. 190 (1976). 
28. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) was handed down after the House voted in Au-
gust 1970 by better than twenty to one to adopt the ERA. Reed and its pre-Craig progeny, 
however, pointedly refrained from explicitly altering the traditional "rational basis" test for 
sex discrimination. The Court's deeds in these cases often belied its words. For an analysis of 
these cases, see Goldstein, The Constitutional Status of Women: The Burger Court and the 
Sexual Revolution in American Law, 3 L. PoL'Y Q. 5 (1981). Craig actually involved discrim-
ination against males (in the age of eligibility to purchase 3.2% alcohol beer), so it was a gift 
to all Americans who favored the gender equity principle of the ERA. 
29. 429 u.s. 190, 197 (1976). 
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If a widely desired constitutional amendment cannot succeed 
in our political environment of weakened political parties and pow-
erful narrow interest groups, one may ask: Would it be preferable 
to allow the Constitution to be amended more easily, say by two-
thirds of the state legislatures, rather than having to rely on our 
unelected judges to save us from constitutional rigidity via "judicial 
amendments?" The answer does not seem to be obvious. 
Still, questions remain. What, for instance explains the gap in 
support between over ninety percent at the congressional level in 
the early seventies and only seventy percent at the state level? What 
was the basis of the intense interest group opposition to the ERA, 
opposition so intense that it managed to push state legislators 
against the tide of public opinion? 
Those who have done the kind of research eschewed by 
Steiner-the public opinion surveyors, those who have studied the 
state legislative debates, sent questionnaires to legislators, or inter-
viewed legislators-can tell us something that his speculative analy-
sis cannot: how these decisionmakers understood themselves and 
their motivations. Of course it is true that decisionmakers may lie 
or engage in self-deception, but the incentives to do so are not par-
ticularly strong on this issue. The picture that emerges from that 
type of research is quite different from the bifurcated focus on abor-
tion and the draft that emerges in Steiner's portrait. 
Janet Boles's interviews with legislators and lobbyists in Illi-
nois and Georgia identified as a major source of ERA opposition 
hostility to the federal courts and a generalized fear that the ERA 
would provide the courts with just one more weapon with which to 
attack state prerogatives.3o This finding was corroborated in other 
scholarship.3I This fear is not totally unrelated to Roe v. Wade but 
its roots extend farther. It grows out of such developments as the 
30. Boles, supra note 3, at 170. 
31. Jane Mansbridge reports the same objection as having been influential. Her re-
search utilized interviews of legislators and lobbyists and survey data. Mansbridge, supra 
note II. Bokowski, State Legislator Perceptions of Public Debate on the Equal Rights 
Amendment, (September 1982) (paper delivered at annual meeting of American Political Sci-
ence Association), reported a similar finding on the basis of newspaper coverage of ERA 
legislative debates preceding ratification and rescission votes in six states. "The most fre-
quently given argument put forth by state legislators [in opposition] was that the ERA would 
remove legislative powers from the states." Bokowski noted that in sheer frequency of men-
tion by the opposition (including lobbyists), "dilution of states' rights" ranked second to 
concerns about the draft/ combat, but in the legislators', as distinguished from lobbyists', 
concerns, states' rights vs. Court power moves into first place. Bokowski's finding from 
newspaper coverage was confirmed in the results of her retrospective questionnaire survey of 
legislators who had been in office in these states during these votes. She reported that "un-
foreseen problems, especially court interpretations" was the "most mentioned anti-ERA justi-
fication" for legislative vote. 
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school prayer decisions of the early sixties, the reapportionment de-
cisions, the exclusionary rule, the requirement of Miranda warn-
ings, and busing. As one Georgia legislator warned about the ERA: 
"Who could have predicted in 1954 that the Brown decision would 
lead to massive busing in 1974?"32 
There is deep irony and perhaps a political lesson here. This 
kind of argument, extremely effective with opposition state legisla-
tors, was not publicly countered, as it conceivably might have been 
by ERA opponents. They might well have replied that the ERA 
was a much more narrowly focused, clearly directed command, 
with a much more lucid legislative history (and thus intent), than 
the extraordinarily unbounded fourteenth amendment (which, of 
course, mentions neither race nor gender and the legislative history 
of which has spawned a large body of scholarly controversy). Thus 
the ERA could have been viewed as a tool against judicial activism, 
as an implement of those political forces who believed the Constitu-
tion should be amended by "the people" rather than by judges. But 
this argument was not in the repertoire of leading ERA proponents, 
for they were, by and large, liberals who liked judicial activism. In-
deed, prominent in the 1970's congressional reasoning as to why the 
ERA was needed was insistence that the Supreme Court should 
have interpreted the equal protection clause as a shield against gen-
der discrimination, but, since the Supreme Court had failed to be 
properly activist in this direction, the ERA was needed. Represen-
tative Martha Griffiths's censure of the Court set the tone: "There 
never was a time when decisions of the Supreme Court could not 
have done everything we ask today ... [but] the Court has held for 
98 years that women, as a class, are not entitled to equal protection 
of the laws. "33 
In short, the argument that could have been used to counter 
the most effective opposition point against the ERA-that the ERA 
would set the Court adrift to roam in unchartered, dangerous terri-
tory-was not publicly presented because it was contrary to the ju-
dicial ideology dominant within the pro-ERA leadership. 
Apart from fear of the judiciary, opposition to the ERA appar-
ently was motivated largely by fear of cultural disruption. The only 
evidence that seems convincingly to point in the direction of a drop 
in support for the ERA during the ratification period is that four 
states did vote to rescind their earlier ratification votes.34 The rescis-
32. Boles,supra note 3, at 170. 
33. 116 CoNG. REC. 28,005 (1970). For similar testimony, see Equal Rights 1970, 
supra note 7, at 163·64, 174, 180-81, 186, 225, 228, 372-73. 
34. While probably not of legal significance, rescission surely is an indicator of legisla-
tive mood. 
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sions, however, were not concentrated in the late 1970's. Nebraska 
rescinded in 1973, Tennessee in 1974, Idaho in 1977, and Kentucky 
in 1978. Deborah Bokowski surveyed legislators who had voted for 
rescission in Nebraska and Tennessee and also some who had done 
so in Indiana, where rescission was defeated. (Indiana had ratified 
only in 1977, so this was a much later vote than in the first two 
states). She noticed that on her questions regarding expectations of 
the ERA's impact these rescission-prone legislators formed a very 
distinctive group of her legislative sample. Fifty percent of these 
legislators believed the ERA would contribute to disintegration of 
the family, forty percent believed women would be drafted and sent 
into combat under the ERA, and fifty percent believed the ERA 
would mean a loss of privacy between the sexes. (None of her ques-
tions mentioned the abortion issue).3s Contrary to her finding, loss 
of privacy-the unisex toilet issue-shows up as thoroughly negligi-
ble in a National Opinion Research Center (NORC) public opinion 
survey done in 1982, in a Roper public opinion survey of 1981,36 
and in Janet Boles's interviews of legislators in three states.37 And 
although a somewhat sizable portion of the people who opposed the 
ERA (in response to open-ended NORC questions: "Why do you 
favor/oppose the ERA?"-for which up to three responses were re-
corded) indicated a concern that the ERA would promote abortion 
(53 out of 585 responses) or would involve women in the draft or 
combat (73 out of 585 responses), the vast bulk of the responses 
indicated opposition to the amendment on grounds that were much 
more a matter of general lifestyle preference. For instance, 144 of 
585 responses gave answers along the lines that men and women 
should not be equal, 71 expressed fear that the ERA will lead in 
some way to disintegration of the traditional family, 88 thought the 
ERA in some way would hurt women, 79 that it in some way would 
hurt men or relations between the sexes, 85 worried that the ERA 
was too extreme or was favored by extremists. These concerns 
completely overwhelm the comparatively rare opposition response 
that showed concern for any specific legal impact, such as the draft 
or abortion.3s 
35. Bokowski, supra note 27. 
36. NORC General Social Survey, 1982, and AIPO No. 177G, July 17-20, 1981 (both 
available through the Roper Center, Storrs, Conn.). 
37. Boles, supra note 3, at 166-80. 
38. The only other negative legal-impact issues mentioned were that women would be-
come priests-five responses-and that unisex toilets would be required-ten responses. An-
other reply that showed up was general hostility to more legislation (twenty-four responses). 
If that one is excluded, the general lifestyle concerns total420 as against 141 for specific legal 
Impact concerns. The Roper survey exhibited a similar pattern of predominance of general 
lifestyle concerns among the objections to ERA. 
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It appears that the concerns expressed by the ERA opponents 
about a loss of financial support for wives, women being sent into 
combat, and the promotion of abortion are best understood as the 
concrete expressions of a more generalized fear of a change in tradi-
tional sex roles. The ERA-for its supporters a symbol of the equal 
dignity of women citizens-to its opponents functions as a symbol 
of the transformation of gender roles. It lived as a symbol and died 
as a symbol. Joyce Gelb and Marian Palley, surveying the relative 
success of a variety of proposals for federal policies affecting wo-
men, argue that, across the range of these policies, those perceived 
as promoting "role equity" for men and women are more likely to 
achieve legislative acceptance than those perceived as promoting 
gender "role change."39 While most Americans favored the ERA 
and did not believe it would dramatically affect gender roles, 
enough Americans feared that it would do so that it failed passage. 
And it was not just the general public who reacted to the ERA 
on a symbolic basis. One woman legislator was not above giving as 
the sole explanation for her "no" vote: "I like having men open 
doors for me." Legislators frequently called the ERA "an attack on 
motherhood" or "an attack on the home."40 Janet Boles concluded 
her 1979 study, based on interviews in three states, with this sen-
tence: "The basic reason for nonratification ... is that the statewide 
conflict over the ERA caused many legislators to look beyond the 
narrow legal merits of the amendment and instead to base their 
votes on personal attitudes on government, society, societal change, 
and the proper role of women. "41 
Something, however, certainly did change by 1983 when con-
gressional sentiment had declined from virtual unanimity of support 
to just short of two-thirds. We can take Steiner's word on the prob-
lem with entangling amendments. But the draft should be distin-
guished from abortion funding on this score. For the draft question 
had been pressed continually in the early 1970's in each of the Sen-
ate hearings; whatever force the issue may once have had, by March 
22, 1972, that force was not enough to produce even substantial 
minority opposition in Congress. This was so even though the war 
was still raging in Southeast Asia and American men were still be-
ing drafted into combat. Surely the draft issue was not more prob-
lematic in 1983, with no active draft and with the nation at peace. 
Abortion funding is a different story. But Steiner is looking in 
the wrong direction when he points the finger of blame at the 
39. J. GELB & M. PALLEY, WOMEN AND PUBLIC POLICIES 7 (1982). 
40. Boles, supra note 3, at 6, 160. 
41. /d. at 178. 
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Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. McRae (1980), which upheld 
as constitutional the Hyde Amendment's denial of Medicaid funds 
for abortion. The United States Supreme Court, in cooperation 
with the early 1970's ERA proponents, had done all that it reason-
ably could to keep the matter of abortion funding separate from 
ERA politics. But feminists more radical in their goals than in the 
early 1970's ERA proponents ended up transforming the very con-
cept of "sex discrimination" on their way to ratification. It was this 
transformation that produced the abortion-funding dilemma. 
When the ERA was debated and adopted in Congress in the 
1970-72 period, its supporters were very careful to create a clear 
record of legislative intent: "[The ERA] would not prohibit reason-
able classifications based on characteristics that are unique to one 
sex. For example a law providing for payment of medical costs of 
childbearing could only apply to women [and thus is not sex dis-
crimination)."42 Laws directly aimed at differences of physiological 
reproductive function were explicitly and repeatedly said to be 
outside the reach of the ERA. 
In 1974, when the Supreme Court decided Geduldig v. Aiel/o,43 
it hewed closely to this approach. It reasoned that for a state to 
refrain from providing maternity benefits to women employees was 
not discriminating against women (only against pregnant people; 
just as providing benefits for pregnant people, according to the offi-
cial ERA reports, would not have been discriminating against 
males).44 Geduldig was a case interpreting the fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection clause; the Court reiterated this analysis in 
1976 in General Electric v. Gilbert,45 a Title VII case. The Court, 
had it wanted to, could have buttressed its argument with quotes 
from congressional testimony of ERA proponents explaining the 
limited meaning of the command, "Equality of rights under the law 
shall not be denied . . . on the basis of sex." 
But the denial of maternity benefits (unlike the provision 
thereof) displeased many feminists in and out of Congress. A bill 
defining employer pregnancy discrimination as part of sex discrimi-
nation, in an amendment to Title VII, passed the Senate in Septem-
ber 1977 with a seventy-five-to-eleven vote. (It stalled in the 
House). The Supreme Court promptly produced a holding that, 
42. Equal Rights 1970, supra note 7; H.R. REP. No. 359, supra note 7; S. REP. No. 689, 
supra note 7; Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 7, at 893-94. 
43. 417 u.s. 484 (1974). 
44. The Court did declare unconstitutional a law firing pregnant teachers, but it did not 
base its decision on sex discrimination. See Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 
u.s. 632 (1974). 
45. 429 U.S. 125 (1970). 
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although General Electric v. Gilbert was not (yet) overruled as to 
medical insurance provisions for maternity benefits, if employers 
deprived women of accumulated seniority when they returned from 
unpaid maternity leave and did not so deprive workers who took off 
for paid medical disability leave, that practice was sex discrimina-
tion within the meaning of Title VII.46 
Congress straightened out this mess by passing the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act in October of 1978 amending Title VII, so that 
pregnant women are protected against employer discrimination in 
hiring, firing, seniority rights, and in the fringe benefits of health 
insurance coverage for childbearing and of medical disability leave 
policy. But one way to discriminate against pregnant women is to 
refuse to insure the medical costs (when every other employee medi-
cal cost is insured) of abortions. In order to achieve passage of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Senate backers of the bill agreed to 
a compromise with pro-life forces in the House that explicitly per-
mits abortion funding exclusions from employer-provided health 
care plans. 
So Title VII now defines as forbidden sex discrimination the 
exclusion of childbearing medical costs ·from comprehensive, em-
ployer health plans, but it does not forbid as sex discrimination the 
exclusion of medical costs for abortion. This sort of zigzagging 
compromise is the stuff of legislative politics; it is a far cry from the 
clear, general principle suitable for a constitutional amendment. 
Thus the ERA currently languishes47 in the Judiciary Committee of 
both houses of Congress. 
46. Nashville Gas v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). 
47. In the current Congress Representative Peter Rodino has introduced it in the 
House, and Senator Edward Kennedy has introduced it in the Senate. See H.R.J. Res. 2, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H73 (1985); S.J. Res. 10, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 
CONG. REC. S73 (1985). 
